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F.6 L'"anarcho"-capitalisme est il contre l'État ?

Sommaire

Non.

De par sa base de propriété privée, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme implique une division en classe de la société en patrons et en travailleurs. Toute cette division nécessitera un état pour le maintenir. Toutefois, il ne doit pas être le même que l'état que existe maintenant. En ce qui concerne ce point, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme préconise clairement "les associations de défense", pour protéger la propriété. Pour les "anarcho"-capitalistes, cependant, ces entreprises privées ne sont pas des Etats. Pour les anarchistes, elles en sont.

Selon Murray Rothbard [ "société sans État", dans Nomos XIX, Pennock et Chapman, eds., P. 192.], Un État doit avoir une ou plusieurs des caractéristiques suivantes:

  1. La capacité à taxer ceux qui vivent en son sein.
  2. Il affirme et, en général, obtient un monopole de la contrainte de la disposition de la défense sur une zone donnée.

Il fait le même point dans "L'Ethique de la Liberté" [p. 171].

Au lieu de cela, les "anarcho"-capitalistes pensent que les gens devraient être en mesure de choisir leur propre "compagnie de défense" (ce qui nécessiterait la police) et les tribunaux à partir du libre marché de la "défense" qui pullulerait après que le monopole d'État ait été éliminé. Ces sociétés "toutes... auraient à se conformer à ce code de loi fondamentale" [1]. Ainsi, un "code général libertarien" gouvernerait les actions de ces sociétés. Ce "code de loi" interdirait les agressions coercitives au moins, même si pour cela, elle devra préciser ce qui est considéré comme des propriétés légitimes, comment dit peut être possédé et ce qui constitue l'agression. Ainsi, le code serait très vaste.

Comment est-ce que ce code de loi est effectivement spécifié ? Ces lois seraient elles démocratiquement décidées ? Seraient-elles le reflet de l'usage commun (c'est-à-dire de la coutume) ? de "l'offre et la demande" ? de "La loi naturelle" ? Compte tenu de la forte aversion pour la démocratie par les "anarcho"-capitalistes, nous pensons pouvoir dire que d'une combinaison de ces deux dernières options seraient utilisés. Murray Rothbard fait valoir que les juges ne "feraient pas la loi mais que la trouverait sur la base d'un accord sur des principes issus soit de la coutume ou la raison"[2]. tandis que David Friedman soutient dans "la machine de la liberté"que les différentes entreprises de défense vendraient leurs propres lois [p. 116]. Il est parfois reconnu que des lois non-libertaire pourrait être exigé (et fournies) dans un tel marché.

Autour de ce système de "compagnies de défense" est un marché libre d'"arbitres" et de "juges d'appel" pour administrer la justice et le "code de loi fondamental". Rothbard estime qu'un tel système aurait des "arbitres avec la meilleure réputation d'efficacité et de probité... [seraient] choisis par les différentes parties sur le marché... [Et] viendra à donner une croissance du business"[3]. Les Juges "prospérerai sur le marché, au prorata de leur réputation d'efficacité et d'impartialité"[4].

Par conséquent, comme toute autre entreprise, les arbitres mettraient tout en œuvre pour les bénéfices et la richesse, avec le plus de succès pour devenir plus "prospère". Bien sûr, une telle richesse n'aurait pas d'impact sur les décisions des juges, et si cela en avait, la population (en théorie) seraient libres de choisir un autre juge (même si, bien entendu, ils mettraient tout en œuvre également pour "les bénéfices et la richesse" -- Ce qui signifie que le choix de caractère peut être un peu limité! - Et les lois qui ont été utilisé pour guider leurs jugements seraient l'application des droits capitalistes).

Que ce système fonctionne ou pas comme vous le souhaitez est discuté dans les sections suivantes. Nous pensons qu'il ne le fera pas. En outre, nous ferons valoir que les "compagnies de défense" "anarcho"-capitaliste réunissent non seulement les critères de l'État que nous avons présenté dans la section B.2, mais aussi les propres critères de Rothbard pour l'État, cité ci-dessus.

En ce qui concerne le critère anarchiste, il est clair que les "compagnies de défense" existent pour défendre la propriété privée, qu'elles sont hiérarchiques (dans la mesure où elles sont des entreprises capitalistes qui défendent le pouvoir de ceux qui les emploient), qu'ils sont des organes de coercition et qu'ils exercent un monopole de la force sur une zone donnée (la zone, dans un premier temps, étant la propriété de la personne ou l'entreprise qui emploie l'«association»). Si, comme l'a noté Ayn Rand (en utilisant une définition Weberienne de l'Etat) un gouvernement est une institution "qui détient le pouvoir exclusif de faire respecter certaines règles de conduite dans une zone géographique donnée "[5], ces "compagnies de défense" sont le moyen par lequel le propriétaire (qui exerce un monopole de déterminer les règles régissant leurs propriétés) fait respecter leurs règles.

Pour cela (et d'autres raisons), nous devrions appeler les compagnies de défense des "anarcho"-capitalistes "d'état privé" - c'est ce qu'ils sont - et l'"anarcho"-capitalisme un capitalisme "d'état privé".

Avant d'aborder ces points plus loin, il est nécessaire de signaler une erreur relativement commune des "anarcho"-capitalistes. C'est l'idée que la "défense" dans le cadre du système qu'ils défendent serait défendre les gens, pas le territoire. Ceci, pour certains, signifie que les compagnies de défense ne sont pas des «États». Toutefois, à mesure que les gens et leurs propriétés et possessions n'existent pas seulement dans la pensée, mais sur la Terre, il est évident que ces compagnies administreront la justice "sur une zone donnée de la planète. Il est également évident, donc, que ces "associations de défense" fonctionneront sur une (la propriété définie par le propriétaire) surface de la terre et de faire respecter les lois, règles et règlements du propriétaire. L'aspect profondément anti-libertaire, voire fasciste, de cet «arrangement» sera examiné dans les sections suivantes.

F.6.1 What's wrong with this "free market" justice?

It does not take much imagination to figure out whose interests "prosperous" arbitrators, judges and defence companies would defend: their own, as well as those who pay their wages -- which is to say, other members of the rich elite. As the law exists to defend property, then it (by definition) exists to defend the power of capitalists against their workers.

Rothbard argues that the "judges" would "not [be] making the law but finding it on the basis of agreed-upon principles derived either from custom or reason" [Rothbard, Op. Cit., p. 206]. However, this begs the question: whose reason? whose customs? Do individuals in different classes share the same customs? The same ideas of right and wrong? Would rich and poor desire the same from a "basic law code"? Obviously not. The rich would only support a code which defended their power over the poor.

Although only "finding" the law, the arbitrators and judges still exert an influence in the "justice" process, an influence not impartial or neutral. As the arbitrators themselves would be part of a profession, with specific companies developing within the market, it does not take a genius to realise that when "interpreting" the "basic law code," such companies would hardly act against their own interests as companies. In addition, if the "justice" system was based on "one dollar, one vote," the "law" would best defend those with the most "votes" (the question of market forces will be discussed in section F.6.3). Moreover, even if "market forces" would ensure that "impartial" judges were dominant, all judges would be enforcing a very partial law code (namely one that defended capitalist property rights). Impartiality when enforcing partial laws hardly makes judgements less unfair.

Thus, due to these three pressures -- the interests of arbitrators/judges, the influence of money and the nature of the law -- the terms of "free agreements" under such a law system would be tilted in favour of lenders over debtors, landlords over tenants, employers over employees, and in general, the rich over the poor, just as we have today. This is what one would expect in a system based on "unrestricted" property rights and a (capitalist) free market. A similar tendency towards the standardisation of output in an industry in response to influences of wealth can be seen from the current media system (see section D.3 -- How does wealth influence the mass media?)

Some "anarcho"-capitalists, however, claim that just as cheaper cars were developed to meet demand, so cheaper defence associations and "people's arbitrators" would develop on the market for the working class. In this way impartiality will be ensured. This argument overlooks a few key points:

Firstly, the general "libertarian" law code would be applicable to all associations, so they would have to operate within a system determined by the power of money and of capital. The law code would reflect, therefore, property not labour and so "socialistic" law codes would be classed as "outlaw" ones. The options then facing working people is to select a firm which best enforced the capitalist law in their favour. And as noted above, the impartial enforcement of a biased law code will hardly ensure freedom or justice for all.

Secondly, in a race between a Jaguar and a Volkswagen Beetle, who is more likely to win? The rich would have "the best justice money can buy," as they do now. Members of the capitalist class would be able to select the firms with the best lawyers, best private cops and most resources. Those without the financial clout to purchase quality "justice" would simply be out of luck - such is the "magic" of the marketplace.

Thirdly, because of the tendency toward concentration, centralisation, and oligopoly under capitalism (due to increasing capital costs for new firms entering the market, as discussed in section C.4), a few companies would soon dominate the market -- with obvious implications for "justice."

Different firms will have different resources. In other words, in a conflict between a small firm and a larger one, the smaller one is at a disadvantage in terms of resources. They may not be in a position to fight the larger company if it rejects arbitration and so may give in simply because, as the "anarcho"-capitalists so rightly point out, conflict and violence will push up a company's costs and so they would have to be avoided by smaller companies. It is ironic that the "anarcho"-capitalist implicitly assumes that every "defence company" is approximately of the same size, with the same resources behind it. In real life, this is clearly not the case.

Fourthly, it is very likely that many companies would make subscription to a specific "defence" firm or court a requirement of employment. Just as today many (most?) workers have to sign no-union contracts (and face being fired if they change their minds), it does not take much imagination to see that the same could apply to "defence" firms and courts. This was/is the case in company towns (indeed, you can consider unions as a form of "defence" firm and these companies refused to recognise them). As the labour market is almost always a buyer's market, it is not enough to argue that workers can find a new job without this condition. They may not and so have to put up with this situation. And if (as seems likely) the laws and rules of the property-owner will take precedence in any conflict, then workers and tenants will be at a disadvantage no matter how "impartial" the judges.

Ironically, some "anarcho"-capitalists point to current day company/union negotiations as an example of how different defence firms would work out their differences peacefully. Sadly for this argument, union rights under "actually existing capitalism" were created and enforced by the state in direct opposition to capitalist "freedom of contract." Before the law was changed, unions were often crushed by force -- the companies were better armed, had more resources and had the law on their side. Today, with the "downsizing" of companies we can see what happens to "peaceful negotiation" and "co-operation" between unions and companies when it is no longer required (i.e. when the resources of both sides are unequal). The market power of companies far exceeds those of the unions and the law, by definition, favours the companies. As an example of how competing "protection agencies" will work in an "anarcho"-capitalist society, it is far more insightful than originally intended!

Now let us consider the "basic law code" itself. How the laws in the "general libertarian law code" would actually be selected is anyone's guess, although many "anarcho"-capitalists support the myth of "natural law," and this would suggest an unchangeable law code selected by those considered as "the voice of nature" (see section F.7. for a discussion of its authoritarian implications). David Friedman argues that as well as a market in defence companies, there will also be a market in laws and rights. However, there will be extensive market pressure to unify these differing law codes into one standard one (imagine what would happen if ever CD manufacturer created a unique CD player, or every computer manufacturer different sized floppy-disk drivers -- little wonder, then, that over time companies standardise their products). Friedman himself acknowledges that this process is likely (and uses the example of standard paper sizes to indicate such a process).

In any event, the laws would not be decided on the basis of "one person, one vote"; hence, as market forces worked their magic, the "general" law code would reflect vested interests and so be very hard to change. As rights and laws would be a commodity like everything else in capitalism, they would soon reflect the interests of the rich -- particularly if those interpreting the law are wealthy professionals and companies with vested interests of their own. Little wonder that the individualist anarchists proposed "trial by jury" as the only basis for real justice in a free society. For, unlike professional "arbitrators," juries are ad hoc, made up of ordinary people and do not reflect power, authority, or the influence of wealth. And by being able to judge the law as well as a conflict, they can ensure a populist revision of laws as society progresses.

Thus a system of "defence" on the market will continue to reflect the influence and power of property owners and wealth and not be subject to popular control beyond choosing between companies to enforce the capitalist laws.

F.6.2 What are the social consequences of such a system?

The "anarcho" capitalist imagines that there will be police agencies, "defence associations," courts, and appeals courts all organised on a free-market basis and available for hire. As David Weick points out, however, the major problem with such a system would not be the corruption of "private" courts and police forces (although, as suggested above, this could indeed be a problem):

"There is something more serious than the 'Mafia danger', and this other problem concerns the role of such 'defence' institutions in a given social and economic context.

"[The] context. . . is one of a free-market economy with no restraints upon accumulation of property. Now, we had an American experience, roughly from the end of the Civil War to the 1930's, in what were in effect private courts, private police, indeed private governments. We had the experience of the (private) Pinkerton police which, by its spies, by its agents provocateurs, and by methods that included violence and kidnapping, was one of the most powerful tools of large corporations and an instrument of oppression of working people. We had the experience as well of the police forces established to the same end, within corporations, by numerous companies. . . . (The automobile companies drew upon additional covert instruments of a private nature, usually termed vigilante, such as the Black Legion). These were, in effect, private armies, and were sometimes described as such. The territories owned by coal companies, which frequently included entire towns and their environs, the stores the miners were obliged by economic coercion to patronise, the houses they lived in, were commonly policed by the private police of the United States Steel Corporation or whatever company owned the properties. The chief practical function of these police was, of course, to prevent labour organisation and preserve a certain balance of 'bargaining.'

"These complexes were a law unto themselves, powerful enough to ignore, when they did not purchase, the governments of various jurisdictions of the American federal system. This industrial system was, at the time, often characterised as feudalism. . . ." ["Anarchist Justice", Op. Cit., pp. 223-224]

For a description of the weaponry and activities of these private armies, the economic historian Maurice Dobbs presents an excellent summary in Studies in Capitalist Development [pp. 353-357]. According to a report on "Private Police Systems" cited by Dobbs, in a town dominated by Republican Steel, the "civil liberties and the rights of labour were suppressed by company police. Union organisers were driven out of town." Company towns had their own (company-run) money, stores, houses and jails and many corporations had machine-guns and tear-gas along with the usual shot-guns, rifles and revolvers. The "usurpation of police powers by privately paid 'guards and 'deputies', often hired from detective agencies, many with criminal records" was "a general practice in many parts of the country."

The local (state-run) law enforcement agencies turned a blind-eye to what was going on (after all, the workers had broken their contracts and so were "criminal aggressors" against the companies) even when union members and strikers were beaten and killed. The workers own defence organisations were the only ones willing to help them, and if the workers seemed to be winning then troops were called in to "restore the peace" (as happened in the Ludlow strike, when strikers originally cheered the troops as they thought they would defend their civil rights; needless to say, they were wrong).

Here we have a society which is claimed by many "anarcho"-capitalists as one of the closest examples to their "ideal," with limited state intervention, free reign for property owners, etc. What happened? The rich reduced the working class to a serf-like existence, capitalist production undermined independent producers (much to the annoyance of individualist anarchists at the time), and the result was the emergence of the corporate America that "anarcho"-capitalists say they oppose.

Are we to expect that "anarcho"-capitalism will be different? That, unlike before, "defence" firms will intervene on behalf of strikers? Given that the "general libertarian law code" will be enforcing capitalist property rights, workers will be in exactly the same situation as they were then. Support of strikers violating property rights would be a violation of the "general libertarian law code" and be costly for profit making firms to do (if not dangerous as they could be "outlawed" by the rest). Thus "anarcho"-capitalism will extend extensive rights and powers to bosses, but few if any rights to rebellious workers. And this difference in power is enshrined within the fundamental institutions of the system.

In evaluating "anarcho"-capitalism's claim to be a form of anarchism, Peter Marshall notes that "private protection agencies would merely serve the interests of their paymasters." [Demanding the Impossible, p. 653] With the increase of private "defence associations" under "really existing capitalism" today (associations that many "anarcho"-capitalists point to as examples of their ideas), we see a vindication of Marshall's claim. There have been many documented experiences of protesters being badly beaten by private security guards. As far as market theory goes, the companies are only supplying what the buyer is demanding. The rights of others are not a factor (yet more "externalities," obviously). Even if the victims successfully sue the company, the message is clear -- social activism can seriously damage your health. With a reversion to "a general libertarian law code" enforced by private companies, this form of "defence" of "absolute" property rights can only increase, perhaps to the levels previously attained in the heyday of US capitalism, as described above by Weick.

F.6.3 But surely market forces will stop abuses by the rich?

Unlikely. The rise of corporations within America indicates exactly how a "general libertarian law code" would reflect the interests of the rich and powerful. The laws recognising corporations as "legal persons" were not primarily a product of "the state" but of private lawyers hired by the rich -- a result with which Rothbard would have no problem. As Howard Zinn notes:

"the American Bar Association, organised by lawyers accustomed to serving the wealthy, began a national campaign of education to reverse the [Supreme] Court decision [that companies could not be considered as a person]. . . . By 1886. . . the Supreme Court had accepted the argument that corporations were 'persons' and their money was property protected by the process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The justices of the Supreme Court were not simply interpreters of the Constitution. They were men of certain backgrounds, of certain [class] interests." [A People's History of the United States, p. 255]

Of course it will be argued that the Supreme Court is a monopoly and so our analysis is flawed. In "anarcho"-capitalism there is no monopoly. But the corporate laws came about because there was a demand for them. That demand would still have existed in "anarcho"-capitalism. Now, while there may be no Supreme Court, Rothbard does maintain that "the basic Law Code . . .would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies" but he maintains that this "would imply no unified legal system"! Even though "[a]ny agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian law code would be open outlaws" and soon crushed this is not, apparently, a monopoly. [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 234] So, you either agree to the law code or you go out of business. And that is not a monopoly! Therefore, we think, our comments on the Supreme Court decision are valid.

If all the available defence firms enforce the same laws, then it can hardly be called "competitive"! And if this is the case (and it is) "when private wealth is uncontrolled, then a police-judicial complex enjoying a clientele of wealthy corporations whose motto is self-interest is hardly an innocuous social force controllable by the possibility of forming or affiliating with competing 'companies.'" [Weick, Op. Cit., p. 225]

This is particularly true if these companies are themselves Big Business and so have a large impact on the laws they are enforcing. If the law code recognises and protects capitalist power, property and wealth as fundamental any attempt to change this is "initiation of force" and so the power of the rich is written into the system from the start!

(And, we must add, if there is a general libertarian law code to which all must subscribe, where does that put customer demand? If people demand a non-libertarian law code, will defence firms refuse to supply it? If so, will not new firms, looking for profit, spring up that will supply what is being demanded? And will that not put them in direct conflict with the existing, pro-general law code ones? And will a market in law codes not just reflect economic power and wealth? David Friedman, who is for a market in law codes, argues that "[i]f almost everyone believes strongly that heroin addiction is so horrible that it should not be permitted anywhere under any circumstances anarcho-capitalist institutions will produce laws against heroin. Laws are being produced on the market, and that is what the market wants." And he adds that "market demands are in dollars, not votes. The legality of heroin will be determined, not by how many are for or against but how high a cost each side is willing to bear in order to get its way." [The Machinery of Freedom, p. 127] And, as the market is less than equal in terms of income and wealth, such a position will mean that the capitalist class will have a higher effective demand than the working class, and more resources to pay for any conflicts that arise. Thus any law codes that develop will tend to reflect the interests of the wealthy.)

Which brings us nicely on to the next problem regarding market forces.

As well as the obvious influence of economic interests and differences in wealth, another problem faces the "free market" justice of "anarcho"-capitalism. This is the "general libertarian law code" itself. Even if we assume that the system actually works like it should in theory, the simple fact remains that these "defence companies" are enforcing laws which explicitly defend capitalist property (and so social relations). Capitalists own the means of production upon which they hire wage-labourers to work and this is an inequality established prior to any specific transaction in the labour market. This inequality reflects itself in terms of differences in power within (and outside) the company and in the "law code" of "anarcho"-capitalism which protects that power against the dispossessed.

In other words, the law code within which the defence companies work assumes that capitalist property is legitimate and that force can legitimately be used to defend it. This means that, in effect, "anarcho"-capitalism is based on a monopoly of law, a monopoly which explicitly exists to defend the power and capital of the wealthy. The major difference is that the agencies used to protect that wealth will be in a weaker position to act independently of their pay-masters. Unlike the state, the "defence" firm is not remotely accountable to the general population and cannot be used to equalise even slightly the power relationships between worker and capitalist.

And, needless to say, it is very likely that the private police forces will give preferential treatment to their wealthier customers (what business does not?) and that the law code will reflect the interests of the wealthier sectors of society (particularly if "prosperous" judges administer that code) in reality, even if not in theory. Since, in capitalist practice, "the customer is always right," the best-paying customers will get their way in "anarcho"-capitalist society.

For example, in chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom, David Friedman presents an example of how a clash of different law codes could be resolved by a bargaining process (the law in question is the death penalty). This process would involve one defence firm giving a sum of money to the other for them accepting the appropriate (anti/pro capital punishment) court. Friedman claims that "[a]s in any good trade, everyone gains" but this is obviously not true. Assuming the anti-capital punishment defence firm pays the pro one to accept an anti-capital punishment court, then, yes, both defence firms have made money and so are happy, so are the anti-capital punishment consumers but the pro-death penalty customers have only (perhaps) received a cut in their bills. Their desire to see criminals hanged (for whatever reason) has been ignored (if they were not in favour of the death penalty, they would not have subscribed to that company). Friedman claims that the deal, by allowing the anti-death penalty firm to cut its costs, will ensure that it "keep its customers and even get more" but this is just an assumption. It is just as likely to loose customers to a defence firm that refuses to compromise (and has the resources to back it up). Friedman's assumption that lower costs will automatically win over people's passions is unfounded. As is the assumption that both firms have equal resources and bargaining power. If the pro-capital punishment firm demands more than the anti can provide and has larger weaponry and troops, then the anti defence firm may have to agree to let the pro one have its way.

So, all in all, it is not clear that "everyone gains" -- there may be a sizeable percentage of those involved who do not "gain" as their desire for capital punishment is traded away by those who claimed they would enforce it.

In other words, a system of competing law codes and privatised rights does not ensure that all consumers interests are meet. Given unequal resources within society, it is also clear that the "effective demand" of the parties involved to see their law codes enforced is drastically different. The wealthy head of a transnational corporation will have far more resources available to him to pay for his laws to be enforced than one of his employees on the assembly line. Moreover, as we argue in sections F.3.1 and F.10.2, the labour market is usually skewed in favour of capitalists. This means that workers have to compromise to get work and such compromises may involve agreeing to join a specific "defence" firm or not join one at all (just as workers are often forced to sign non-union contracts today in order to get work). In other words, a privatised law system is very likely to skew the enforcement of laws in line with the skewing of income and wealth in society. At the very least, unlike every other market, the customer is not guaranteed to get exactly what they demand simply because the product they "consume" is dependent on other within the same market to ensure its supply. The unique workings of the law/defence market are such as to deny customer choice (we will discuss other aspects of this unique market shortly).

Weick sums up by saying "any judicial system is going to exist in the context of economic institutions. If there are gross inequalities of power in the economic and social domains, one has to imagine society as strangely compartmentalised in order to believe that those inequalities will fail to reflect themselves in the judicial and legal domain, and that the economically powerful will be unable to manipulate the legal and judicial system to their advantage. To abstract from such influences of context, and then consider the merits of an abstract judicial system. . . is to follow a method that is not likely to take us far. This, by the way, is a criticism that applies. . .to any theory that relies on a rule of law to override the tendencies inherent in a given social and economic system" [Weick, Op. Cit., p. 225] (For a discussion of this problem as it would surface in attempts to protect the environment under "anarcho"-capitalism, see sections E.2 and E.3).

There is another reason why "market forces" will not stop abuse by the rich, or indeed stop the system from turning from private to public statism. This is due to the nature of the "defence" market (for a similar analysis of the "defence" market see Tyler Cowen's "Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy" in Economics and Philosophy, no. 8 (1992), pp. 249-267 and "Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of Anarchy" in Economics and Philosophy, no. 10 (1994), pp. 329-332). In "anarcho"-capitalist theory it is assumed that the competing "defence companies" have a vested interest in peacefully settling differences between themselves by means of arbitration. In order to be competitive on the market, companies will have to co-operate via contractual relations otherwise the higher price associated with conflict will make the company uncompetitive and it will go under. Those companies that ignore decisions made in arbitration would be outlawed by others, ostracised and their rulings ignored. By this process, it is argued, a system of competing "defence" companies will be stable and not turn into a civil war between agencies with each enforcing the interests of their clients against others by force.

However, there is a catch. Unlike every other business in competition, the private state must co-operate with its fellows in order to provide its services for its customers. They need to be able to agree to courts and judges, agree to abide by decisions and law codes and so forth. This means that collusion (where companies in a market agree to work together to restrict competition and reap the benefits of monopoly) is built into the system. In other words, the necessary contractual relations between agencies in the "protection" market require that firms co-operate and, by so doing, to behave (effectively) as one large firm.

For example, it does not matter to me if Safeway has good relations with Tesco if I shop there. The goods I buy are independent of the relationships that exist between competing companies. However, in the case of private states, this is not the case. If a specific "defence" company has bad relationships with other companies in the market then it's against my self-interest to subscribe to it. Why join a private state if its judgements are ignored by the others and it has to resort to violence to be heard? This, as well as being potentially dangerous, will also push up the prices I have to pay. Arbitration is one of the most important services a defence firm can offer its customers and its market share is based upon being able to settle interagency disputes without risk of war or uncertainty that the final outcome will not be accepted by all parties.

Therefore, the market set-up within the "anarcho"-capitalist "defence" market is such that private states have to co-operate with the others (or go out of business fast) and this means collusion can take place. In other words, a system of private states will have to agree to work together in order to provide the service of "law enforcement" to their customers and the result of such co-operation is to create a cartel. However, unlike cartels in other industries, the "defence" cartel will be a stable body simply because its members have to work with their competitors in order to survive.

Let us look at what would happen after such a cartel is formed in a specific area and a new "defence company" desired to enter the market. This new company will have to work with the members of the cartel in order to provide its services to its customers (note that "anarcho"-capitalists already assume that they "will have to" subscribe to the same law code). If the new defence firm tries to under-cut the cartel's monopoly prices, the other companies would refuse to work with it. Having to face constant conflict or the possibility of conflict, seeing its decisions being ignored by other agencies and being uncertain what the results of a dispute would be, few would patronise the new "defence company." The new company's prices would go up and so face either folding or joining the cartel. Unlike every other market, if a "defence company" does not have friendly, co-operative relations with other firms in the same industry then it will go out of business.

This means that the firms that are co-operating have but to agree not to deal with new firms which are attempting to undermine the cartel in order for them to fail. A "cartel busting" firm goes out of business in the same way an outlaw one does - the higher costs associated with having to solve all its conflicts by force, not arbitration, increases its production costs much higher than the competitors and the firm faces insurmountable difficulties selling its products at a profit (ignoring any drop of demand due to fears of conflict by actual and potential customers). Even if we assume that many people will happily join the new firm in spite of the dangers to protect themselves against the cartel and its taxation (i.e. monopoly profits), enough will remain members of the cartel (perhaps they will be fired if they change, perhaps they dislike change and think the extra money is worth peace, perhaps they fear that by joining the new company their peace will be disrupted or the outcomes of their problems with others too unsure to be worth it, perhaps they are shareholders and want to maintain their income) so that co-operation will still be needed and conflict unprofitable and dangerous (and as the cartel will have more resources than the new firm, it could usually hold out longer than the new firm could). In effect, breaking the cartel may take the form of an armed revolution -- as it would with any state.

The forces that break up cartels and monopolies in other industries (such as free entry -- although, of course the "defence" market will be subject to oligopolistic tendencies as any other and this will create barriers to entry, see section C.4) do not work here and so new firms have to co-operate or loose market share and/or profits. This means that "defence companies" will reap monopoly profits and, more importantly, have a monopoly of force over a given area.

Hence a monopoly of private states will develop in addition to the existing monopoly of law and this is a de facto monopoly of force over a given area (i.e. some kind of public state run by share holders). New companies attempting to enter the "defence" industry will have to work with the existing cartel in order to provide the services it offers to its customers. The cartel is in a dominant position and new entries into the market either become part of it or fail. This is exactly the position with the state, with "private agencies" free to operate as long as they work to the state's guidelines. As with the monopolist "general libertarian law code", if you do not toe the line, you go out of business fast.

It is also likely that a multitude of cartels would develop, with a given cartel operating in a given locality. This is because law enforcement would be localised in given areas as most crime occurs where the criminal lives. Few criminals would live in New York and commit crimes in Portland. However, as defence companies have to co-operate to provide their services, so would the cartels. Few people live all their lives in one area and so firms from different cartels would come into contact, so forming a cartel of cartels.

A cartel of cartels may (perhaps) be less powerful than a local cartel, but it would still be required and for exactly the same reasons a local one is. Therefore "anarcho"-capitalism would, like "actually existing capitalism," be marked by a series of public states covering given areas, co-ordinated by larger states at higher levels. Such a set up would parallel the United States in many ways except it would be run directly by wealthy shareholders without the sham of "democratic" elections. Moreover, as in the USA and other states there will still be a monopoly of rules and laws (the "general libertarian law code").

Some "anarcho"-capitalists claim that this will not occur, but that the co-operation needed to provide the service of law enforcement will somehow not turn into collusion between companies. However, they are quick to argue that renegade "agencies" (for example, the so-called "Mafia problem" or those who reject judgements) will go out of business because of the higher costs associated with conflict and not arbitration. However, these higher costs are ensured because the firms in question do not co-operate with others. If other agencies boycott a firm but co-operate with all the others, then the boycotted firm will be at the same disadvantage -- regardless of whether it is a cartel buster or a renegade.

The "anarcho"-capitalist is trying to have it both ways. If the punishment of non-conforming firms cannot occur, then "anarcho"-capitalism will turn into a war of all against all or, at the very least, the service of social peace and law enforcement cannot be provided. If firms cannot deter others from disrupting the social peace (one service the firm provides) then "anarcho"-capitalism is not stable and will not remain orderly as agencies develop which favour the interests of their own customers and enforce their own law codes at the expense of others. If collusion cannot occur (or is too costly) then neither can the punishment of non-conforming firms and "anarcho"-capitalism will prove to be unstable.

So, to sum up, the "defence" market of private states has powerful forces within it to turn it into a monopoly of force over a given area. From a privately chosen monopoly of force over a specific (privately owned) area, the market of private states will turn into a monopoly of force over a general area. This is due to the need for peaceful relations between companies, relations which are required for a firm to secure market share. The unique market forces that exist within this market ensure collusion and monopoly.

In other words, the system of private states will become a cartel and so a public state - unaccountable to all but its shareholders, a state of the wealthy, by the wealthy, for the wealthy. In other words, fascism.

F.6.4 Pourquoi ces « associations de défense » sont-elles des États ?

Il est clair que les associations de défense "anarcho"-capitaliste répondent aux critères d'un État décrit dans la section B.2 ( "Pourquoi les anarchistes sont contre l'État"). Ils défendent la propriété et préservent les relations hiérarchiques, ils mettent en pratique la contrainte, et ce sont des institutions hiérarchiques qui gouvernent ceux en desous d'eux au nom d'une « Ã©lite dirigeante Â», c'est-à-dire ceux qui emploient à la fois la force du gouvernement et ceux qu'ils gouvernent. Ainsi, depuis une perspective anarchiste, ces "associations de défense" sont définitivement des États.

Ce qui est intéressant, cependant, c'est que, de par leur propre définition une très bonne affaire peut être faite de ces "associations de défense" en tant qu'état dans le sens "anarcho"-capitaliste aussi. Les apologistes capitalistes en général définissent un « gouvernement Â» (ou un état) comme ceux qui ont un monopole de la force et de la contrainte dans une zone donnée. Par rapport au reste de la société, ces associations de défense auraient un monopole de la force et la contrainte d'un morceau de propriété, ce qui, par la propre définition "anarcho"-capitaliste de l'État, ces associations seraient admissibles!

Si nous regardons la définition de l'État de Rothbard, qui exige que (a) le pouvoir d'imposition et / ou (b) d'un "monopole de la contrainte de la disposition de la défense sur une zone donnée", l'"anarcho"-capitalisme se heurte à des difficultés.

En premier lieu, les frais de location des associations de défense seront déduites de la richesse créée par ceux qui utilisent, mais ne la possede pas, la propriété des capitalistes et des propriétaires. N'oublions pas qu'un capitaliste n'emploit un travailleur ou ne loue la terre et un logement que s'il a un bénéfice à le faire. Sans le travail du travailleur, il n'y aurait rien à vendre et aucun salaire pour payer le loyer. Ainsi, une compagnie de défense des entreprises ou d'un propriétaire sera payée grâce aux recettes recueillies auprès des pouvoirs capitalistes pour extraire une taxe de ceux qui utilisent, mais ne possèdent pas, une propriété. En d'autres termes, les travailleurs paieront pour les agences qui imposeront l'autorité des employeurs sur eux par l'intermédiaire du système des salaires et de loyer - la fiscalité sous une forme plus insidieuse.

En second lieu, sous le capitalisme la plupart des gens passent une grande partie de leur temps sur la propriété d'autres personnes - cela étant, ils travaillent pour les capitalistes et / ou vivent dans des logements locatifs. Par conséquent, si les propriétaires sélectionnent une "association de défense" pour protéger leurs usines, leurs fermes, leurs logements locatifs, etc, leurs employés et leurs locataires considèreront cela comme un "monopole de la contrainte de la disposition de la défense sur une zone donnée". Certainement que les employés et les locataires ne seront pas en mesure d'embaucher leurs propres sociétés de défense pour exproprier les capitalistes et les propriétaires. Donc, du point de vue des employés et des locataires, les propriétaires ont un monopole de la "défense" sur les zones en question. Bien sûr, l'"anarcho"-capitaliste fera valoir que les locataires et les travailleurs "consentent" à toutes les règles et les conditions d'un contrat quand ils le signent et le propriétaire du monopole n'est pas "sous la contrainte". Toutefois, l'argument du "consentement" est tellement faible dans des conditions d'inégalité à en devenir inutile (voir les sections F.2.4 et F.3.1, par exemple) et, en outre, elle peut et a été utilisé pour justifier l'État. En d'autres termes, le « consentement Â» en soi ne garantit pas qu'un régime ne soit pas étatiste (voir la section F.2.3 pour en savoir plus sur ce sujet). Ainsi, un argument en ce sens est profondément erroné et peut être utilisé pour justifier des régimes qui ne sont guère mieux que "le féodalisme industriel" (comme les villes, par exemple - une institution avec lequel l'"anarcho"-capitalisme n'a pas de problème). Même le "code de loi général libertarien" pourrait être considéré comme un "monopole du gouvernement sur un domaine particulier", en particulier si les gens ordinaires n'ont pas de véritable moyen d'influer sur le code, soit parce qu'elle est axée sur le marché et que l'argent est déterminant, Ou parce qu'elle sera une loi "naturelle", intouchable par de simples mortels.

En d'autres termes, si l'État "s'arroge à lui-même un monopole de la force, du pouvoir décisionnel ultime, sur une zone territoriale donnée"[1] alors c'est assez clair que le propriétaire partage ce pouvoir. Le propriétaire est, après tout, celui qui a le "pouvoir ultime de décision" dans leurs entreprises ou sur leurs terres. Si le patron a une aversion pour vous (par exemple, vous ne suivez pas leurs ordres), vous obtiendrez alors le licenciement. Si vous ne pouvez pas obtenir un emploi ou louer une terre sans l'accord de certaines conditions (par exemple de ne pas adhérer à un syndicat ou d'adhérer à la "société de défense" approuvé par votre employeur), vous pouvez soit signer le contrat ou chercher autre chose. Bien sûr, Rothbard ne parvient pas à remarquer que les patrons ont ce monopole du pouvoir et qu'il est plutôt à parler d'"interdire l'achat et la vente volontaire de la défense et des services judiciaires"[2]. Mais tout aussi sûrement que la loi des contrats permet l'interdiction des syndicats sur une propriété, il peut tout aussi bien interdire la vente et l'achat de la défense et des services judiciaires (il pourrait faire valoir que les forces du marché mettent fin à cette situation, mais c'est probable que les patrons aient généralement l'avantage sur le marché du travail et que les travailleurs aient à faire des compromis pour obtenir un emploi -voir la section F.10.2 sur les raisons pour lesquelles c'est le cas). Après tout, dans les compagnies des villes, seules les compagnies d'argent sont légales, et les compagnies de police la seule à imposer les lois.

Par conséquent, il est évident que le système des "anarcho"-capitalistes répondent aux critères Weberiens d'un monopole à faire respecter certaines règles dans une zone territoriale donnée. Le "code de loi général libertarien" est un monopole et les propriétaires déterminent les règles qui s'appliquent à leurs propriétés. En outre, si les règles que les propriétaires imposent sont soumises à des règles contenues dans le monopolistique "code de loi général libertarien" (par exemple, qu'ils ne peuvent pas interdire la vente et l'achat de certains produits - tels que la défense - sur leur propre territoire) alors l'"anarcho"-capitalisme répond définitivement à la définition Weberienne de l'état (telle que décrite par Ayn Rand comme une institution "qui détient le pouvoir exclusif de faire respecter certaines règles de conduite dans une zone géographique donnée"[3]) du fait que son « code de loi Â» l'emporte sur la volonté des propriétaires à faire ce qu'ils veulent sur leurs propriétés.

Par conséquent, peu importe la façon dont vous regardez ça de plus près, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme et son marché de la "défense" favorise un "monopole de pouvoir de décision ultime" sur un "territoire donné". Il est évident que, pour des anarchistes, le système des "anarcho"-capitalistes est un système étatique. Étant donné que, comme nous le constatons, une affaire raisonnable peut être prise pour cela également, un état, dans la théorie "anarcho"-capitaliste aussi bien.

Donc, en effet, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme a un type différent d'État, dans lequel un patrons embauche et licencie le policier. Comme Peter Sabatini le note [4], "parmi le Libertarianisme, Rothbard représente une vue minoritaire qui actuellement fait valoir l'élimination totale de l'État. Toutefois la demande de Rothbard comme anarchiste est rapidement annulé lorsqu'il est montré qu'il veut seulement une fin de l'état public. À sa place, il permet d'innombrables Etats privés, avec chaque personne s'approvisionnant de leurs propres forces de police, d'armée, et de droit, ou encore l'achat de ces services auprès de fournisseurs capitaliste... Rothbard ne voit rien, aprés tout, de mal à l'accumulation de la richesse, donc ceux qui ont plus de capital auront inévitablement une plus grande force coercitive à leur disposition, tout comme ils le font maintenant".

Loin de vouloir abolir l'État, les "anarcho"-capitalistes désirent seulement le privatiser - de le tenir pour seul responsable de la richesse capitaliste. Leur "compagnie" effectue les mêmes services que l'État, pour les mêmes personnes, de la même manière. Toutefois, il existe une légère différence. Les propriétaires seraient en mesure de choisir entre des entreprises en concurrence pour leurs "services". Etant donné que ces "compagnies" sont employés par le patron, elles seraient utilisés pour renforcer le caractère totalitaire des entreprises capitalistes en veillant à ce que la police et la loi, soient appliqué, même un peu, aux gens ordinaires.

De l'"association de défense" jusqu'au marché de la défense lui-même (comme nous l'avons fait valoir dans la dernière section), ce sera une entente mafieuse[5] et qui ainsi deviendra une sorte de d'État public. La nature même du secteur d'état privé, de sa nécessité de coopérer avec d'autres de la même industrie, le pousse vers un réseau de monopole des entreprises et donc un monopole de la force sur une zone donnée. Étant donné les hypothèses utilisées pour défendre l'"anarcho"-capitalisme, son système d'étatisme privé se développera dans l'étatisme public - un état géré par les gestionnaires responsables uniquement de la part de rétention d'élite.

Pour citer de nouveau Peter Marshall, les "anarcho"-capitalistes "clament que tous bénéficieraient du libre échange sur le marché, il n'est nullement certain que tout système de marché libre ait plus de chances de parrainer un retour à une société inégalitaire avec les associations de défense perpétuant l'exploitation et le privilège"[6]. L'histoire, et la pratique actuelle, prouvent ce point ci.

En bref, les "anarcho"-capitalistes ne sont pas du tout des anarchistes, ils ne sont que des capitalistes qui souhaitent voir des États privés se développer - des Etats qui ont strictement rendus des comptes à leurs bailleurs sans même un simulacre de démocratie que nous connaissons aujourd'hui. Par conséquent, un bien meilleur nom pour l'"anarcho"-capitalisme serait capitalisme d'"Etat privé". Au moins notre façon de faire pose une juste idée de ce qu'ils essaient de nous vendre. Comme Bob Black l'écrit dans The Libertarian as conservator "À mon sens un [libertarien][7] est juste un minarchiste qui abolirait l'État pour sa propre satisfaction en l'appelant autre chose... Ils ne sont pas à dénoncer ce que l'État fait, ils s'opposent simplement à qui le fait".

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