F.6 L'"anarcho"-capitalisme est il contre l'État ?
Non.
De par sa base de propriété privée, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme implique une division en classe de la société en patrons et en travailleurs. Toute cette division nécessitera un état pour le maintenir. Toutefois, il ne doit pas être le même que l'état que existe maintenant. En ce qui concerne ce point, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme préconise clairement "les associations de défense", pour protéger la propriété. Pour les "anarcho"-capitalistes, cependant, ces entreprises privées ne sont pas des Etats. Pour les anarchistes, elles en sont.
Selon Murray Rothbard [ "société sans État", dans Nomos XIX, Pennock et Chapman, eds., P. 192.], Un État doit avoir une ou plusieurs des caractéristiques suivantes:
- La capacité à taxer ceux qui vivent en son sein.
- Il affirme et, en général, obtient un monopole de la contrainte de la disposition de la défense sur une zone donnée.
Il fait le même point dans "L'Ethique de la Liberté" [p. 171].
Au lieu de cela, les "anarcho"-capitalistes pensent que les gens devraient être en mesure de choisir leur propre "compagnie de défense" (ce qui nécessiterait la police) et les tribunaux à partir du libre marché de la "défense" qui pullulerait après que le monopole d'État ait été éliminé. Ces sociétés "toutes... auraient à se conformer à ce code de loi fondamentale" [1]. Ainsi, un "code général libertarien" gouvernerait les actions de ces sociétés. Ce "code de loi" interdirait les agressions coercitives au moins, même si pour cela, elle devra préciser ce qui est considéré comme des propriétés légitimes, comment dit peut être possédé et ce qui constitue l'agression. Ainsi, le code serait très vaste.
Comment est-ce que ce code de loi est effectivement spécifié ? Ces lois seraient elles démocratiquement décidées ? Seraient-elles le reflet de l'usage commun (c'est-à -dire de la coutume) ? de "l'offre et la demande" ? de "La loi naturelle" ? Compte tenu de la forte aversion pour la démocratie par les "anarcho"-capitalistes, nous pensons pouvoir dire que d'une combinaison de ces deux dernières options seraient utilisés. Murray Rothbard fait valoir que les juges ne "feraient pas la loi mais que la trouverait sur la base d'un accord sur des principes issus soit de la coutume ou la raison"[2]. tandis que David Friedman soutient dans "la machine de la liberté"que les différentes entreprises de défense vendraient leurs propres lois [p. 116]. Il est parfois reconnu que des lois non-libertaire pourrait être exigé (et fournies) dans un tel marché.
Autour de ce système de "compagnies de défense" est un marché libre d'"arbitres" et de "juges d'appel" pour administrer la justice et le "code de loi fondamental". Rothbard estime qu'un tel système aurait des "arbitres avec la meilleure réputation d'efficacité et de probité... [seraient] choisis par les différentes parties sur le marché... [Et] viendra à donner une croissance du business"[3]. Les Juges "prospérerai sur le marché, au prorata de leur réputation d'efficacité et d'impartialité"[4].
Par conséquent, comme toute autre entreprise, les arbitres mettraient tout en œuvre pour les bénéfices et la richesse, avec le plus de succès pour devenir plus "prospère". Bien sûr, une telle richesse n'aurait pas d'impact sur les décisions des juges, et si cela en avait, la population (en théorie) seraient libres de choisir un autre juge (même si, bien entendu, ils mettraient tout en œuvre également pour "les bénéfices et la richesse" -- Ce qui signifie que le choix de caractère peut être un peu limité! - Et les lois qui ont été utilisé pour guider leurs jugements seraient l'application des droits capitalistes).
Que ce système fonctionne ou pas comme vous le souhaitez est discuté dans les sections suivantes. Nous pensons qu'il ne le fera pas. En outre, nous ferons valoir que les "compagnies de défense" "anarcho"-capitaliste réunissent non seulement les critères de l'État que nous avons présenté dans la section B.2, mais aussi les propres critères de Rothbard pour l'État, cité ci-dessus.
En ce qui concerne le critère anarchiste, il est clair que les "compagnies de défense" existent pour défendre la propriété privée, qu'elles sont hiérarchiques (dans la mesure où elles sont des entreprises capitalistes qui défendent le pouvoir de ceux qui les emploient), qu'ils sont des organes de coercition et qu'ils exercent un monopole de la force sur une zone donnée (la zone, dans un premier temps, étant la propriété de la personne ou l'entreprise qui emploie l'«association»). Si, comme l'a noté Ayn Rand (en utilisant une définition Weberienne de l'Etat) un gouvernement est une institution "qui détient le pouvoir exclusif de faire respecter certaines règles de conduite dans une zone géographique donnée "[5], ces "compagnies de défense" sont le moyen par lequel le propriétaire (qui exerce un monopole de déterminer les règles régissant leurs propriétés) fait respecter leurs règles.
Pour cela (et d'autres raisons), nous devrions appeler les compagnies de défense des "anarcho"-capitalistes "d'état privé" - c'est ce qu'ils sont - et l'"anarcho"-capitalisme un capitalisme "d'état privé".
Avant d'aborder ces points plus loin, il est nécessaire de signaler une erreur relativement commune des "anarcho"-capitalistes. C'est l'idée que la "défense" dans le cadre du système qu'ils défendent serait défendre les gens, pas le territoire. Ceci, pour certains, signifie que les compagnies de défense ne sont pas des «États». Toutefois, à mesure que les gens et leurs propriétés et possessions n'existent pas seulement dans la pensée, mais sur la Terre, il est évident que ces compagnies administreront la justice "sur une zone donnée de la planète. Il est également évident, donc, que ces "associations de défense" fonctionneront sur une (la propriété définie par le propriétaire) surface de la terre et de faire respecter les lois, règles et règlements du propriétaire. L'aspect profondément anti-libertaire, voire fasciste, de cet «arrangement» sera examiné dans les sections suivantes.
It does not take much imagination to figure out whose interests "prosperous"
arbitrators, judges and defence companies would defend: their own, as well
as those who pay their wages -- which is to say, other members of the rich
elite. As the law exists to defend property, then it (by definition) exists
to defend the power of capitalists against their workers.
Rothbard argues that the "judges" would "not [be] making the law but
finding it on the basis of agreed-upon principles derived either from
custom or reason" [Rothbard, Op. Cit., p. 206]. However, this begs the
question: whose reason? whose customs? Do individuals in different
classes share the same customs? The same ideas of right and wrong? Would
rich and poor desire the same from a "basic law code"? Obviously not. The
rich would only support a code which defended their power over the poor.
Although only "finding" the law, the arbitrators and judges still exert
an influence in the "justice" process, an influence not impartial or
neutral. As the arbitrators themselves would be part of a profession, with
specific companies developing within the market, it does not take a
genius to realise that when "interpreting" the "basic law code," such
companies would hardly act against their own interests as companies. In
addition, if the "justice" system was based on "one dollar, one vote," the
"law" would best defend those with the most "votes" (the question of
market forces will be discussed in section F.6.3). Moreover, even if
"market forces" would ensure that "impartial" judges were dominant, all
judges would be enforcing a very partial law code (namely one that
defended capitalist property rights). Impartiality when enforcing
partial laws hardly makes judgements less unfair.
Thus, due to these three pressures -- the interests of arbitrators/judges,
the influence of money and the nature of the law -- the terms of "free
agreements" under such a law system would be tilted in favour of lenders
over debtors, landlords over tenants, employers over employees, and in
general, the rich over the poor, just as we have today. This is what one
would expect in a system based on "unrestricted" property rights and a
(capitalist) free market. A similar tendency towards the standardisation
of output in an industry in response to influences of wealth can be seen
from the current media system (see section D.3 -- How does wealth
influence the mass media?)
Some "anarcho"-capitalists, however, claim that just as cheaper cars were
developed to meet demand, so cheaper defence associations and "people's
arbitrators" would develop on the market for the working class. In this
way impartiality will be ensured. This argument overlooks a few key points:
Firstly, the general "libertarian" law code would be applicable to all
associations, so they would have to operate within a system determined
by the power of money and of capital. The law code would reflect,
therefore, property not labour and so "socialistic" law codes would
be classed as "outlaw" ones. The options then facing working people
is to select a firm which best enforced the capitalist law in their
favour. And as noted above, the impartial enforcement of a biased law
code will hardly ensure freedom or justice for all.
Secondly, in a race between a Jaguar and a Volkswagen Beetle, who is more
likely to win? The rich would have "the best justice money can buy," as
they do now. Members of the capitalist class would be able to select the
firms with the best lawyers, best private cops and most resources. Those
without the financial clout to purchase quality "justice" would simply be
out of luck - such is the "magic" of the marketplace.
Thirdly, because of the tendency toward concentration, centralisation,
and oligopoly under capitalism (due to increasing capital costs for new
firms entering the market, as discussed in section C.4), a few companies
would soon dominate the market -- with obvious implications for "justice."
Different firms will have different resources. In other words, in a
conflict between a small firm and a larger one, the smaller one is at a
disadvantage in terms of resources. They may not be in a position to fight
the larger company if it rejects arbitration and so may give in simply
because, as the "anarcho"-capitalists so rightly point out, conflict and
violence will push up a company's costs and so they would have to be avoided
by smaller companies. It is ironic that the "anarcho"-capitalist implicitly
assumes that every "defence company" is approximately of the same size, with
the same resources behind it. In real life, this is clearly not the case.
Fourthly, it is very likely that many companies would make subscription to
a specific "defence" firm or court a requirement of employment. Just as today
many (most?) workers have to sign no-union contracts (and face being fired
if they change their minds), it does not take much imagination to see that
the same could apply to "defence" firms and courts. This was/is the case
in company towns (indeed, you can consider unions as a form of "defence"
firm and these companies refused to recognise them). As the labour market
is almost always a buyer's market, it is not enough to argue that workers
can find a new job without this condition. They may not and so have to put
up with this situation. And if (as seems likely) the laws and rules of the
property-owner will take precedence in any conflict, then workers and tenants
will be at a disadvantage no matter how "impartial" the judges.
Ironically, some "anarcho"-capitalists point to current day company/union
negotiations as an example of how different defence firms would work
out their differences peacefully. Sadly for this argument, union rights
under "actually existing capitalism" were created and enforced by the
state in direct opposition to capitalist "freedom of contract." Before
the law was changed, unions were often crushed by force -- the companies
were better armed, had more resources and had the law on their side.
Today, with the "downsizing" of companies we can see what happens to
"peaceful negotiation" and "co-operation" between unions and companies
when it is no longer required (i.e. when the resources of both sides
are unequal). The market power of companies far exceeds those of the
unions and the law, by definition, favours the companies. As an example
of how competing "protection agencies" will work in an "anarcho"-capitalist
society, it is far more insightful than originally intended!
Now let us consider the "basic law code" itself. How the laws in the
"general libertarian law code" would actually be selected is anyone's
guess, although many "anarcho"-capitalists support the myth of "natural
law," and this would suggest an unchangeable law code selected by those
considered as "the voice of nature" (see section F.7. for a discussion of
its authoritarian implications). David Friedman argues that as well as a
market in defence companies, there will also be a market in laws and rights.
However, there will be extensive market pressure to unify these differing
law codes into one standard one (imagine what would happen if ever CD
manufacturer created a unique CD player, or every computer manufacturer
different sized floppy-disk drivers -- little wonder, then, that over
time companies standardise their products). Friedman himself acknowledges
that this process is likely (and uses the example of standard paper sizes
to indicate such a process).
In any event, the laws would not be decided on the basis of "one person, one
vote"; hence, as market forces worked their magic, the "general" law code
would reflect vested interests and so be very hard to change. As rights and
laws would be a commodity like everything else in capitalism, they would soon
reflect the interests of the rich -- particularly if those interpreting the
law are wealthy professionals and companies with vested interests of their
own. Little wonder that the individualist anarchists proposed "trial by jury"
as the only basis for real justice in a free society. For, unlike professional
"arbitrators," juries are ad hoc, made up of ordinary people and do not
reflect power, authority, or the influence of wealth. And by being able
to judge the law as well as a conflict, they can ensure a populist revision
of laws as society progresses.
Thus a system of "defence" on the market will continue to reflect the
influence and power of property owners and wealth and not be subject to
popular control beyond choosing between companies to enforce the capitalist
laws.
The "anarcho" capitalist imagines that there will be police agencies,
"defence associations," courts, and appeals courts all organised on a
free-market basis and available for hire. As David Weick points out,
however, the major problem with such a system would not be the corruption
of "private" courts and police forces (although, as suggested above, this
could indeed be a problem):
"[The] context. . . is one of a free-market economy with no restraints
upon accumulation of property. Now, we had an American experience,
roughly from the end of the Civil War to the 1930's, in what were in
effect private courts, private police, indeed private governments. We
had the experience of the (private) Pinkerton police which, by its spies,
by its agents provocateurs, and by methods that included violence and
kidnapping, was one of the most powerful tools of large corporations
and an instrument of oppression of working people. We had the experience
as well of the police forces established to the same end, within
corporations, by numerous companies. . . . (The automobile companies
drew upon additional covert instruments of a private nature, usually
termed vigilante, such as the Black Legion). These were, in effect,
private armies, and were sometimes described as such. The territories
owned by coal companies, which frequently included entire towns and their
environs, the stores the miners were obliged by economic coercion to
patronise, the houses they lived in, were commonly policed by the private
police of the United States Steel Corporation or whatever company owned
the properties. The chief practical function of these police was, of
course, to prevent labour organisation and preserve a certain balance of
'bargaining.'
"These complexes were a law unto themselves, powerful enough to ignore,
when they did not purchase, the governments of various jurisdictions of
the American federal system. This industrial system was, at the time,
often characterised as feudalism. . . ." ["Anarchist Justice",
Op. Cit.,
pp. 223-224]
For a description of the weaponry and activities of these private armies,
the economic historian Maurice Dobbs presents an excellent summary in
Studies in Capitalist Development [pp. 353-357]. According to a report on
"Private Police Systems" cited by Dobbs, in a town dominated by Republican
Steel, the "civil liberties and the rights of labour were suppressed by
company police. Union organisers were driven out of town." Company towns
had their own (company-run) money, stores, houses and jails and many
corporations had machine-guns and tear-gas along with the usual shot-guns,
rifles and revolvers. The "usurpation of police powers by privately paid
'guards and 'deputies', often hired from detective agencies, many with
criminal records" was "a general practice in many parts of the country."
The local (state-run) law enforcement agencies turned a blind-eye to what
was going on (after all, the workers had broken their contracts and
so were "criminal aggressors" against the companies) even when union
members and strikers were beaten and killed. The workers own defence
organisations were the only ones willing to help them, and if the workers
seemed to be winning then troops were called in to "restore the peace"
(as happened in the Ludlow strike, when strikers originally cheered
the troops as they thought they would defend their civil rights; needless
to say, they were wrong).
Here we have a society which is claimed by many "anarcho"-capitalists
as one of the closest examples to their "ideal," with limited state
intervention, free reign for property owners, etc. What happened? The
rich reduced the working class to a serf-like existence, capitalist
production undermined independent producers (much to the annoyance of
individualist anarchists at the time), and the result was the emergence
of the corporate America that "anarcho"-capitalists say they oppose.
Are we to expect that "anarcho"-capitalism will be different? That, unlike
before, "defence" firms will intervene on behalf of strikers? Given that
the "general libertarian law code" will be enforcing capitalist property
rights, workers will be in exactly the same situation as they were then.
Support of strikers violating property rights would be a violation of
the "general libertarian law code" and be costly for profit making firms
to do (if not dangerous as they could be "outlawed" by the rest). Thus
"anarcho"-capitalism will extend extensive rights and powers to bosses,
but few if any rights to rebellious workers. And this difference in power
is enshrined within the fundamental institutions of the system.
In evaluating "anarcho"-capitalism's claim to be a form of anarchism,
Peter Marshall notes that "private protection agencies would merely serve
the interests of their paymasters." [Demanding the Impossible, p. 653]
With the increase of private "defence associations" under "really existing
capitalism" today (associations that many "anarcho"-capitalists point to
as examples of their ideas), we see a vindication of Marshall's claim.
There have been many documented experiences of protesters being badly
beaten by private security guards. As far as market theory goes, the
companies are only supplying what the buyer is demanding. The rights of
others are not a factor (yet more "externalities," obviously). Even
if the victims successfully sue the company, the message is clear --
social activism can seriously damage your health. With a reversion
to "a general libertarian law code" enforced by private companies,
this form of "defence" of "absolute" property rights can only increase,
perhaps to the levels previously attained in the heyday of US capitalism,
as described above by Weick.
Unlikely. The rise of corporations within America indicates exactly how a
"general libertarian law code" would reflect the interests of the rich and
powerful. The laws recognising corporations as "legal persons" were not
primarily a product of "the state" but of private lawyers hired by the
rich -- a result with which Rothbard would have no problem. As Howard
Zinn notes:
If all the available defence firms enforce the same laws, then it can
hardly be called "competitive"! And if this is the case (and it is)
"when private wealth is uncontrolled, then a police-judicial complex
enjoying a clientele of wealthy corporations whose motto is self-interest
is hardly an innocuous social force controllable by the possibility of
forming or affiliating with competing 'companies.'" [Weick, Op. Cit.,
p. 225]
This is particularly true if these companies are themselves Big Business
and so have a large impact on the laws they are enforcing. If the law
code recognises and protects capitalist power, property and wealth as
fundamental any attempt to change this is "initiation of force" and
so the power of the rich is written into the system from the start!
(And, we must add, if there is a general libertarian law code to which
all must subscribe, where does that put customer demand? If people demand
a non-libertarian law code, will defence firms refuse to supply it? If so,
will not new firms, looking for profit, spring up that will supply what
is being demanded? And will that not put them in direct conflict with the
existing, pro-general law code ones? And will a market in law codes not
just reflect economic power and wealth? David Friedman, who is for a market
in law codes, argues that "[i]f almost everyone believes strongly that
heroin addiction is so horrible that it should not be permitted anywhere
under any circumstances anarcho-capitalist institutions will produce laws
against heroin. Laws are being produced on the market, and that is what the
market wants." And he adds that "market demands are in dollars, not votes.
The legality of heroin will be determined, not by how many are for or against
but how high a cost each side is willing to bear in order to get its way."
[The Machinery of Freedom, p. 127] And, as the market is less than equal
in terms of income and wealth, such a position will mean that the capitalist
class will have a higher effective demand than the working class, and more
resources to pay for any conflicts that arise. Thus any law codes that
develop will tend to reflect the interests of the wealthy.)
Which brings us nicely on to the next problem regarding market forces.
As well as the obvious influence of economic interests and differences
in wealth, another problem faces the "free market" justice of
"anarcho"-capitalism. This is the "general libertarian law code" itself.
Even if we assume that the system actually works like it should in theory,
the simple fact remains that these "defence companies" are enforcing laws
which explicitly defend capitalist property (and so social relations).
Capitalists own the means of production upon which they hire wage-labourers
to work and this is an inequality established prior to any specific
transaction in the labour market. This inequality reflects itself in
terms of differences in power within (and outside) the company and
in the "law code" of "anarcho"-capitalism which protects that power
against the dispossessed.
In other words, the law code within which the defence companies work
assumes that capitalist property is legitimate and that force can
legitimately be used to defend it. This means that, in effect,
"anarcho"-capitalism is based on a monopoly of law, a monopoly which
explicitly exists to defend the power and capital of the wealthy.
The major difference is that the agencies used to protect that
wealth will be in a weaker position to act independently of their
pay-masters. Unlike the state, the "defence" firm is not remotely
accountable to the general population and cannot be used to equalise
even slightly the power relationships between worker and capitalist.
And, needless to say, it is very likely that the private police forces
will give preferential treatment to their wealthier customers (what
business does not?) and that the law code will reflect the interests of the
wealthier sectors of society (particularly if "prosperous" judges administer
that code) in reality, even if not in theory. Since, in capitalist practice,
"the customer is always right," the best-paying customers will get their
way in "anarcho"-capitalist society.
For example, in chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom, David Friedman
presents an example of how a clash of different law codes could be resolved
by a bargaining process (the law in question is the death penalty). This
process would involve one defence firm giving a sum of money to the other
for them accepting the appropriate (anti/pro capital punishment) court.
Friedman claims that "[a]s in any good trade, everyone gains" but this
is obviously not true. Assuming the anti-capital punishment defence firm
pays the pro one to accept an anti-capital punishment court, then, yes,
both defence firms have made money and so are happy, so are the anti-capital
punishment consumers but the pro-death penalty customers have only (perhaps)
received a cut in their bills. Their desire to see criminals hanged (for
whatever reason) has been ignored (if they were not in favour of the
death penalty, they would not have subscribed to that company). Friedman
claims that the deal, by allowing the anti-death penalty firm to cut its
costs, will ensure that it "keep its customers and even get more" but
this is just an assumption. It is just as likely to loose customers to a
defence firm that refuses to compromise (and has the resources to back it
up). Friedman's assumption that lower costs will automatically win over
people's passions is unfounded. As is the assumption that both firms have
equal resources and bargaining power. If the pro-capital punishment firm
demands more than the anti can provide and has larger weaponry and troops,
then the anti defence firm may have to agree to let the pro one have its
way.
So, all in all, it is not clear that "everyone gains" -- there may be a
sizeable percentage of those involved who do not "gain" as their desire for
capital punishment is traded away by those who claimed they would enforce
it.
In other words, a system of competing law codes and privatised rights
does not ensure that all consumers interests are meet. Given unequal
resources within society, it is also clear that the "effective demand"
of the parties involved to see their law codes enforced is drastically
different. The wealthy head of a transnational corporation will have far
more resources available to him to pay for his laws to be enforced than
one of his employees on the assembly line. Moreover, as we argue in sections
F.3.1 and F.10.2, the labour market is usually skewed in favour of capitalists.
This means that workers have to compromise to get work and such compromises
may involve agreeing to join a specific "defence" firm or not join one
at all (just as workers are often forced to sign non-union contracts
today in order to get work). In other words, a privatised law system
is very likely to skew the enforcement of laws in line with the skewing
of income and wealth in society. At the very least, unlike every other
market, the customer is not guaranteed to get exactly what they demand
simply because the product they "consume" is dependent on other within
the same market to ensure its supply. The unique workings of the
law/defence market are such as to deny customer choice (we will
discuss other aspects of this unique market shortly).
Weick sums up by saying "any judicial system is going to exist in the
context of economic institutions. If there are gross inequalities of
power in the economic and social domains, one has to imagine society as
strangely compartmentalised in order to believe that those inequalities
will fail to reflect themselves in the judicial and legal domain, and that
the economically powerful will be unable to manipulate the legal and
judicial system to their advantage. To abstract from such influences of
context, and then consider the merits of an abstract judicial system. . .
is to follow a method that is not likely to take us far. This, by the
way, is a criticism that applies. . .to any theory that relies on a rule
of law to override the tendencies inherent in a given social and economic
system" [Weick, Op. Cit., p. 225] (For a discussion of this problem
as it would surface in attempts to protect the environment under
"anarcho"-capitalism, see sections E.2 and E.3).
There is another reason why "market forces" will not stop abuse by the rich,
or indeed stop the system from turning from private to public statism. This
is due to the nature of the "defence" market (for a similar analysis of
the "defence" market see Tyler Cowen's "Law as a Public Good: The Economics
of Anarchy" in Economics and Philosophy, no. 8 (1992),
pp. 249-267 and
"Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of Anarchy" in Economics
and Philosophy, no. 10 (1994), pp. 329-332). In "anarcho"-capitalist theory
it is assumed that the competing "defence companies" have a vested interest
in peacefully settling differences between themselves by means of arbitration.
In order to be competitive on the market, companies will have to co-operate
via contractual relations otherwise the higher price associated with conflict
will make the company uncompetitive and it will go under. Those companies
that ignore decisions made in arbitration would be outlawed by others,
ostracised and their rulings ignored. By this process, it is argued, a
system of competing "defence" companies will be stable and not turn into
a civil war between agencies with each enforcing the interests of their
clients against others by force.
However, there is a catch. Unlike every other business in competition,
the private state must co-operate with its fellows in order to provide its
services for its customers. They need to be able to agree to courts and
judges, agree to abide by decisions and law codes and so forth. This means
that collusion (where companies in a market agree to work together to
restrict competition and reap the benefits of monopoly) is built into the
system. In other words, the necessary contractual relations between agencies
in the "protection" market require that firms co-operate and, by so doing,
to behave (effectively) as one large firm.
For example, it does not matter to me if Safeway has good relations with
Tesco if I shop there. The goods I buy are independent of the relationships
that exist between competing companies. However, in the case of private
states, this is not the case. If a specific "defence" company has bad
relationships with other companies in the market then it's against my
self-interest to subscribe to it. Why join a private state if its judgements
are ignored by the others and it has to resort to violence to be heard?
This, as well as being potentially dangerous, will also push up the prices
I have to pay. Arbitration is one of the most important services a defence
firm can offer its customers and its market share is based upon being able
to settle interagency disputes without risk of war or uncertainty that the
final outcome will not be accepted by all parties.
Therefore, the market set-up within the "anarcho"-capitalist "defence" market
is such that private states have to co-operate with the others (or go out
of business fast) and this means collusion can take place. In other words,
a system of private states will have to agree to work together in order to
provide the service of "law enforcement" to their customers and the result
of such co-operation is to create a cartel. However, unlike cartels in other
industries, the "defence" cartel will be a stable body simply because its
members have to work with their competitors in order to survive.
Let us look at what would happen after such a cartel is formed in a specific
area and a new "defence company" desired to enter the market. This new
company will have to work with the members of the cartel in order to provide
its services to its customers (note that "anarcho"-capitalists already
assume that they "will have to" subscribe to the same law code). If the
new defence firm tries to under-cut the cartel's monopoly prices, the other
companies would refuse to work with it. Having to face constant conflict or
the possibility of conflict, seeing its decisions being ignored by other
agencies and being uncertain what the results of a dispute would be, few
would patronise the new "defence company." The new company's prices would
go up and so face either folding or joining the cartel. Unlike every other
market, if a "defence company" does not have friendly, co-operative relations
with other firms in the same industry then it will go out of business.
This means that the firms that are co-operating have but to agree not to
deal with new firms which are attempting to undermine the cartel in order
for them to fail. A "cartel busting" firm goes out of business in the same
way an outlaw one does - the higher costs associated with having to solve
all its conflicts by force, not arbitration, increases its production
costs much higher than the competitors and the firm faces insurmountable
difficulties selling its products at a profit (ignoring any drop of
demand due to fears of conflict by actual and potential customers).
Even if we assume that many people will happily join the new firm in spite
of the dangers to protect themselves against the cartel and its taxation
(i.e. monopoly profits), enough will remain members of the cartel (perhaps
they will be fired if they change, perhaps they dislike change and think
the extra money is worth peace, perhaps they fear that by joining the
new company their peace will be disrupted or the outcomes of their problems
with others too unsure to be worth it, perhaps they are shareholders and
want to maintain their income) so that co-operation will still be needed
and conflict unprofitable and dangerous (and as the cartel will have more
resources than the new firm, it could usually hold out longer than the new
firm could). In effect, breaking the cartel may take the form of an
armed revolution -- as it would with any state.
The forces that break up cartels and monopolies in other industries (such as
free entry -- although, of course the "defence" market will be subject to
oligopolistic tendencies as any other and this will create barriers to entry,
see section C.4) do not work here and so new firms have to co-operate or loose
market share and/or profits. This means that "defence companies" will reap
monopoly profits and, more importantly, have a monopoly of force over a given
area.
Hence a monopoly of private states will develop in addition to the existing
monopoly of law and this is a de facto monopoly of force over a given
area (i.e. some kind of public state run by share holders). New companies
attempting to enter the "defence" industry will have to work with the
existing cartel in order to provide the services it offers to its customers.
The cartel is in a dominant position and new entries into the market either
become part of it or fail. This is exactly the position with the state,
with "private agencies" free to operate as long as they work to the state's
guidelines. As with the monopolist "general libertarian law code", if
you do not toe the line, you go out of business fast.
It is also likely that a multitude of cartels would develop, with a given
cartel operating in a given locality. This is because law enforcement
would be localised in given areas as most crime occurs where the criminal
lives. Few criminals would live in New York and commit crimes in Portland.
However, as defence companies have to co-operate to provide their services,
so would the cartels. Few people live all their lives in one area and so
firms from different cartels would come into contact, so forming a
cartel of cartels.
A cartel of cartels may (perhaps) be less powerful than a local cartel, but
it would still be required and for exactly the same reasons a local one
is. Therefore "anarcho"-capitalism would, like "actually existing capitalism,"
be marked by a series of public states covering given areas, co-ordinated by
larger states at higher levels. Such a set up would parallel the United States
in many ways except it would be run directly by wealthy shareholders without
the sham of "democratic" elections. Moreover, as in the USA and other states
there will still be a monopoly of rules and laws (the "general libertarian
law code").
Some "anarcho"-capitalists claim that this will not occur, but that the
co-operation needed to provide the service of law enforcement will somehow
not turn into collusion between companies. However, they are quick to
argue that renegade "agencies" (for example, the so-called "Mafia
problem" or those who reject judgements) will go out of business because
of the higher costs associated with conflict and not arbitration. However,
these higher costs are ensured because the firms in question do not
co-operate with others. If other agencies boycott a firm but co-operate with
all the others, then the boycotted firm will be at the same disadvantage
-- regardless of whether it is a cartel buster or a renegade.
The "anarcho"-capitalist is trying to have it both ways. If the punishment
of non-conforming firms cannot occur, then "anarcho"-capitalism will turn
into a war of all against all or, at the very least, the service of social
peace and law enforcement cannot be provided. If firms cannot deter others
from disrupting the social peace (one service the firm provides) then
"anarcho"-capitalism is not stable and will not remain orderly as agencies
develop which favour the interests of their own customers and enforce their
own law codes at the expense of others. If collusion cannot occur (or is
too costly) then neither can the punishment of non-conforming firms and
"anarcho"-capitalism will prove to be unstable.
So, to sum up, the "defence" market of private states has powerful forces
within it to turn it into a monopoly of force over a given area. From a
privately chosen monopoly of force over a specific (privately owned) area,
the market of private states will turn into a monopoly of force over a
general area. This is due to the need for peaceful relations between
companies, relations which are required for a firm to secure market
share. The unique market forces that exist within this market ensure
collusion and monopoly.
In other words, the system of private states will become a cartel and so a
public state - unaccountable to all but its shareholders, a state of the
wealthy, by the wealthy, for the wealthy. In other words, fascism.
Il est clair que les associations de défense "anarcho"-capitaliste répondent aux critères d'un État décrit dans la section B.2 ( "Pourquoi les anarchistes sont contre l'État"). Ils défendent la propriété et préservent les relations hiérarchiques, ils mettent en pratique la contrainte, et ce sont des institutions hiérarchiques qui gouvernent ceux en desous d'eux au nom d'une « élite dirigeante », c'est-à -dire ceux qui emploient à la fois la force du gouvernement et ceux qu'ils gouvernent. Ainsi, depuis une perspective anarchiste, ces "associations de défense" sont définitivement des États.
Ce qui est intéressant, cependant, c'est que, de par leur propre définition une très bonne affaire peut être faite de ces "associations de défense" en tant qu'état dans le sens "anarcho"-capitaliste aussi. Les apologistes capitalistes en général définissent un « gouvernement » (ou un état) comme ceux qui ont un monopole de la force et de la contrainte dans une zone donnée. Par rapport au reste de la société, ces associations de défense auraient un monopole de la force et la contrainte d'un morceau de propriété, ce qui, par la propre définition "anarcho"-capitaliste de l'État, ces associations seraient admissibles!
Si nous regardons la définition de l'État de Rothbard, qui exige que (a) le pouvoir d'imposition et / ou (b) d'un "monopole de la contrainte de la disposition de la défense sur une zone donnée", l'"anarcho"-capitalisme se heurte à des difficultés.
En premier lieu, les frais de location des associations de défense seront déduites de la richesse créée par ceux qui utilisent, mais ne la possede pas, la propriété des capitalistes et des propriétaires. N'oublions pas qu'un capitaliste n'emploit un travailleur ou ne loue la terre et un logement que s'il a un bénéfice à le faire. Sans le travail du travailleur, il n'y aurait rien à vendre et aucun salaire pour payer le loyer. Ainsi, une compagnie de défense des entreprises ou d'un propriétaire sera payée grâce aux recettes recueillies auprès des pouvoirs capitalistes pour extraire une taxe de ceux qui utilisent, mais ne possèdent pas, une propriété. En d'autres termes, les travailleurs paieront pour les agences qui imposeront l'autorité des employeurs sur eux par l'intermédiaire du système des salaires et de loyer - la fiscalité sous une forme plus insidieuse.
En second lieu, sous le capitalisme la plupart des gens passent une grande partie de leur temps sur la propriété d'autres personnes - cela étant, ils travaillent pour les capitalistes et / ou vivent dans des logements locatifs. Par conséquent, si les propriétaires sélectionnent une "association de défense" pour protéger leurs usines, leurs fermes, leurs logements locatifs, etc, leurs employés et leurs locataires considèreront cela comme un "monopole de la contrainte de la disposition de la défense sur une zone donnée". Certainement que les employés et les locataires ne seront pas en mesure d'embaucher leurs propres sociétés de défense pour exproprier les capitalistes et les propriétaires. Donc, du point de vue des employés et des locataires, les propriétaires ont un monopole de la "défense" sur les zones en question. Bien sûr, l'"anarcho"-capitaliste fera valoir que les locataires et les travailleurs "consentent" à toutes les règles et les conditions d'un contrat quand ils le signent et le propriétaire du monopole n'est pas "sous la contrainte". Toutefois, l'argument du "consentement" est tellement faible dans des conditions d'inégalité à en devenir inutile (voir les sections F.2.4 et F.3.1, par exemple) et, en outre, elle peut et a été utilisé pour justifier l'État. En d'autres termes, le « consentement » en soi ne garantit pas qu'un régime ne soit pas étatiste (voir la section F.2.3 pour en savoir plus sur ce sujet). Ainsi, un argument en ce sens est profondément erroné et peut être utilisé pour justifier des régimes qui ne sont guère mieux que "le féodalisme industriel" (comme les villes, par exemple - une institution avec lequel l'"anarcho"-capitalisme n'a pas de problème). Même le "code de loi général libertarien" pourrait être considéré comme un "monopole du gouvernement sur un domaine particulier", en particulier si les gens ordinaires n'ont pas de véritable moyen d'influer sur le code, soit parce qu'elle est axée sur le marché et que l'argent est déterminant, Ou parce qu'elle sera une loi "naturelle", intouchable par de simples mortels.
En d'autres termes, si l'État "s'arroge à lui-même un monopole de la force, du pouvoir décisionnel ultime, sur une zone territoriale donnée"[1] alors c'est assez clair que le propriétaire partage ce pouvoir. Le propriétaire est, après tout, celui qui a le "pouvoir ultime de décision" dans leurs entreprises ou sur leurs terres. Si le patron a une aversion pour vous (par exemple, vous ne suivez pas leurs ordres), vous obtiendrez alors le licenciement. Si vous ne pouvez pas obtenir un emploi ou louer une terre sans l'accord de certaines conditions (par exemple de ne pas adhérer à un syndicat ou d'adhérer à la "société de défense" approuvé par votre employeur), vous pouvez soit signer le contrat ou chercher autre chose. Bien sûr, Rothbard ne parvient pas à remarquer que les patrons ont ce monopole du pouvoir et qu'il est plutôt à parler d'"interdire l'achat et la vente volontaire de la défense et des services judiciaires"[2]. Mais tout aussi sûrement que la loi des contrats permet l'interdiction des syndicats sur une propriété, il peut tout aussi bien interdire la vente et l'achat de la défense et des services judiciaires (il pourrait faire valoir que les forces du marché mettent fin à cette situation, mais c'est probable que les patrons aient généralement l'avantage sur le marché du travail et que les travailleurs aient à faire des compromis pour obtenir un emploi -voir la section F.10.2 sur les raisons pour lesquelles c'est le cas). Après tout, dans les compagnies des villes, seules les compagnies d'argent sont légales, et les compagnies de police la seule à imposer les lois.
Par conséquent, il est évident que le système des "anarcho"-capitalistes répondent aux critères Weberiens d'un monopole à faire respecter certaines règles dans une zone territoriale donnée. Le "code de loi général libertarien" est un monopole et les propriétaires déterminent les règles qui s'appliquent à leurs propriétés. En outre, si les règles que les propriétaires imposent sont soumises à des règles contenues dans le monopolistique "code de loi général libertarien" (par exemple, qu'ils ne peuvent pas interdire la vente et l'achat de certains produits - tels que la défense - sur leur propre territoire) alors l'"anarcho"-capitalisme répond définitivement à la définition Weberienne de l'état (telle que décrite par Ayn Rand comme une institution "qui détient le pouvoir exclusif de faire respecter certaines règles de conduite dans une zone géographique donnée"[3]) du fait que son « code de loi » l'emporte sur la volonté des propriétaires à faire ce qu'ils veulent sur leurs propriétés.
Par conséquent, peu importe la façon dont vous regardez ça de plus près, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme et son marché de la "défense" favorise un "monopole de pouvoir de décision ultime" sur un "territoire donné". Il est évident que, pour des anarchistes, le système des "anarcho"-capitalistes est un système étatique. Étant donné que, comme nous le constatons, une affaire raisonnable peut être prise pour cela également, un état, dans la théorie "anarcho"-capitaliste aussi bien.
Donc, en effet, l'"anarcho"-capitalisme a un type différent d'État, dans lequel un patrons embauche et licencie le policier. Comme Peter Sabatini le note [4], "parmi le Libertarianisme, Rothbard représente une vue minoritaire qui actuellement fait valoir l'élimination totale de l'État. Toutefois la demande de Rothbard comme anarchiste est rapidement annulé lorsqu'il est montré qu'il veut seulement une fin de l'état public. À sa place, il permet d'innombrables Etats privés, avec chaque personne s'approvisionnant de leurs propres forces de police, d'armée, et de droit, ou encore l'achat de ces services auprès de fournisseurs capitaliste... Rothbard ne voit rien, aprés tout, de mal à l'accumulation de la richesse, donc ceux qui ont plus de capital auront inévitablement une plus grande force coercitive à leur disposition, tout comme ils le font maintenant".
Loin de vouloir abolir l'État, les "anarcho"-capitalistes désirent seulement le privatiser - de le tenir pour seul responsable de la richesse capitaliste. Leur "compagnie" effectue les mêmes services que l'État, pour les mêmes personnes, de la même manière. Toutefois, il existe une légère différence. Les propriétaires seraient en mesure de choisir entre des entreprises en concurrence pour leurs "services". Etant donné que ces "compagnies" sont employés par le patron, elles seraient utilisés pour renforcer le caractère totalitaire des entreprises capitalistes en veillant à ce que la police et la loi, soient appliqué, même un peu, aux gens ordinaires.
De l'"association de défense" jusqu'au marché de la défense lui-même (comme nous l'avons fait valoir dans la dernière section), ce sera une entente mafieuse[5] et qui ainsi deviendra une sorte de d'État public. La nature même du secteur d'état privé, de sa nécessité de coopérer avec d'autres de la même industrie, le pousse vers un réseau de monopole des entreprises et donc un monopole de la force sur une zone donnée. Étant donné les hypothèses utilisées pour défendre l'"anarcho"-capitalisme, son système d'étatisme privé se développera dans l'étatisme public - un état géré par les gestionnaires responsables uniquement de la part de rétention d'élite.
Pour citer de nouveau Peter Marshall, les "anarcho"-capitalistes "clament que tous bénéficieraient du libre échange sur le marché, il n'est nullement certain que tout système de marché libre ait plus de chances de parrainer un retour à une société inégalitaire avec les associations de défense perpétuant l'exploitation et le privilège"[6]. L'histoire, et la pratique actuelle, prouvent ce point ci.
En bref, les "anarcho"-capitalistes ne sont pas du tout des anarchistes, ils ne sont que des capitalistes qui souhaitent voir des États privés se développer - des Etats qui ont strictement rendus des comptes à leurs bailleurs sans même un simulacre de démocratie que nous connaissons aujourd'hui. Par conséquent, un bien meilleur nom pour l'"anarcho"-capitalisme serait capitalisme d'"Etat privé". Au moins notre façon de faire pose une juste idée de ce qu'ils essaient de nous vendre. Comme Bob Black l'écrit dans The Libertarian as conservator "À mon sens un [libertarien][7] est juste un minarchiste qui abolirait l'État pour sa propre satisfaction en l'appelant autre chose... Ils ne sont pas à dénoncer ce que l'État fait, ils s'opposent simplement à qui le fait".
F.6.1 What's wrong with this "free market" justice?
F.6.2 What are the social consequences of such a system?
"There is something more serious than the 'Mafia danger', and this other
problem concerns the role of such 'defence' institutions in a given social
and economic context.
F.6.3 But surely market forces will stop abuses by the rich?
"the American Bar Association, organised by lawyers accustomed to
serving the wealthy, began a national campaign of education to reverse
the [Supreme] Court decision [that companies could not be considered as
a person]. . . . By 1886. . . the Supreme Court had accepted the argument
that corporations were 'persons' and their money was property protected by
the process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The justices of the
Supreme Court were not simply interpreters of the Constitution. They were
men of certain backgrounds, of certain [class] interests." [A People's
History of the United States, p. 255]
Of course it will be argued that the Supreme Court is a monopoly and so
our analysis is flawed. In "anarcho"-capitalism there is no monopoly.
But the corporate laws came about because there was a demand for them.
That demand would still have existed in "anarcho"-capitalism. Now, while
there may be no Supreme Court, Rothbard does maintain that "the basic
Law Code . . .would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies"
but he maintains that this "would imply no unified legal system"! Even
though "[a]ny agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian law
code would be open outlaws" and soon crushed this is not, apparently,
a monopoly. [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 234] So, you either agree to
the law code or you go out of business. And that is not a monopoly!
Therefore, we think, our comments on the Supreme Court decision are
valid.
F.6.4 Pourquoi ces « associations de défense » sont-elles des États ?
Notes et références